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Abstract—This paper considers a Cournot competi-
tion between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a
homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand.
Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute ex-
plicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore,
we analize the effects of the tax rate and the degree of
altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.
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1 Introduction
In some industries, such as education and health care,
both nonprofit and for-profit firms coexist and compete
against each other. A for-profit firm is subject to profit
taxation whereas a nonprofit firm receives benefits from
tax exemption. However, nonprofit firms are not allowed
to raise capital through equity financing. They also face
non-distribution constraints. In the United States, tax
practitioners from public accounting firms decide whether
a nonprofit hospital should maintain tax exemptions. Re-
ported profits and charitable care are the two major de-
terminants of the final decision (see [9]). Due to competi-
tion and expected future profits, some nonprofit hospitals
were converted to for-profit hospitals (see [1]).
In this paper, we closely follow Lien [2], by considering a
competition between a nonprofit firm (hospital) and a for-
profit firm (hospital). It is therefore reasonable to include
profit as one of the objectives for the nonprofit hospital.
Of course, there are other (altruistic) objectives that the
hospital has to account for to justify its nonprofit status.
Sansing [5] constructs an analytical model for competi-
tion between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm taking
into account different production objective functions and
different tax treatment. The model is then applied to
evaluate the potential of joint ventures between the two
firms. Specifically, Sansing [5] assumes a linear profit
tax with symmetry between gains and losses. If a firm
earns profits, it incurs a tax proportional to its profits.
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On the other hand, if there is a loss, the firm receives a
subsidy (i.e., a negative income tax). He also assumes
that the objective of the nonprofit hospital can be writ-
ten as a weighted sum of its own profit and consumer
surplus. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is then derived.
The symmetric taxation assumption, however, eliminates
the effects of the tax rate on the firms production deci-
sion. Consequently, the equilibrium is independent of the
tax rate despite that tax being recognized as an impor-
tant element in the model and the key benefit of nonprofit
status. In reality, the tax system is asymmetric such that
the firm pays no tax and receives no subsides when in-
curring losses. Lien [2] incorporates the asymmetric na-
ture of profit tax and a stochastic demand schedule into
the Sansing framework. Specifically, instead of a subsidy,
there is no subsidy or tax when a for-profit firm incurs a
loss. He constructed the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and
demonstrated the effect of profit tax on the market equi-
librium. In contrast to Lien [2], we are able to compute
explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. This is due to
the fact that we consider the demand following a partic-
ular probability distribution. However, again in contrast
to Lien [2], the mean of the random variable that we con-
sider does not have to be zero.
The paper is organized as follows In the next section, we
have describe the benchmark model. Section 3 incorpo-
rates demand uncertainty into the asymmetric taxation
framework and presents the objective functions for each
firm. Optimal production decisions and the resulting
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the modified framework
are computed in Section 4.
2 The Benchmark model
Consider two firms competing in a homogeneous product
market. Firm 1 is for profit and firm F2 is nonprofit. The
inverse demand function is specified as follows:
p = α− q,
where p is the market price and q is the quantity de-
manded. Firms have the same constant marginal cost c.
We consider from now on prices net of marginal costs.
This is without loss of generality since if marginal cost is
positive, we may replace α by α − c. Let qi denote the
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production level of firm Fi. The profit for firm Fi is then
pii = (α− q1 − q2)qi.
firm F1 is for profit and its profit is subject to taxation.
Let t denote the profit tax rate. The firm incurs a tax
of tpi1 (0 < t < 1). Note that this tax structure provides
the firm a subsidy when it incurs a loss. The after-tax
profit is then pia1 = (1 − t)pi1. Firm F1 chooses the op-
timal production level to maximize its after-tax profit.
However, maximizing a pia1 is equivalent to maximizing
pi1. The tax rate has no effect on the firm’s production
decision. On the other hand, firm F2 is a nonprofit orga-
nization. Therefore, in choosing the optimal production
level, it must take into account an altruistic objective.
Sansing (2000) adopts the consumer surplus in his study.
Due to its not-for-profit nature, firm F2 is not subject to
any profit taxation. For a given demand quantity, q, the
consumer surplus is measured as follows:
CS =
∫ q
0
(α− z)dz − (α− q)q = q
2
2
Let w denote the importance of the consumer surplus for
firm F2 relative to its profit. The firm’s objective function
(or utility function) is written as W = pi2 + wCS, or
W = (α− q1 − q2)q2 + w2 (q1 + q2)
2,
where w is the weight assigned to the consumer surplus
(i.e., the firm’s altruistic preference). Firm F2 chooses its
optimal production level to maximize W . We consider a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which each firm chooses its
optimal production level assuming the other firm main-
tains its current production level. To maximize pia1 , the
optimal production level, q∗1 , must satisfy the following
first order condition:
α− (2q1 + q2) = 0 (1)
whereas the second order condition obviously holds. Sim-
ilarly, to maximize W , the optimal production level of
firm F2, q∗2 , must satisfy the following equation:
α− (1− w)q1 − (2− w)q2 = 0 (2)
By solving equations (1) and (2) simultaneously, we have
q∗1 =
(1− w)α
3− w , (3)
q∗2 =
(1 + w)α
3− w . (4)
Non-negative outputs imply w ≤ 1. That is, the non-
profit firm cannot weight the C.S. more than of its own
profit. Moreover ∂q∗1/∂w = (−2α)/(w − 3)2 < 0 and
∂q∗2/∂w > 0. As the nonprofit firm becomes more altru-
istic, it expands the production level to enhance consumer
surplus.
3 Demand uncertainty and asymmetric
taxation
Suppose that we replace the symmetric taxation with a
more realistic asymmetric taxation in the framework such
that the firm incurs a tax of tpi1 (0 < t < 1) only if it
earns a profit, i.e., pi1 > 0. No tax is imposed when the
firm incurs a loss, i.e., pi1 < 0. The after-tax profit is
then
pia1 = pi1 − tmax{pi1, 0}. (5)
Firm F1 chooses the optimal production level to maxi-
mize its after-tax profit. Within the current demand and
cost structure, the firm will not incur any loss. Conse-
quently, pia1 = (1 − t)pi1. Maximizing pia1 is equivalent to
maximizing pi1. Once again, the tax rate has no effect
on the firm’s production decision. To highlight the effect
of the tax rate, either the demand function or the cost
function must be modified. In this paper, we consider a
stochastic inverse demand function such that
p = α+∆− q (6)
where ∆ is a random variable, representing the demand
shock. We consider that
∆ =
{
ε, with probability φ
−ε, with probability 1− φ .
Both firms make their production decisions prior to the
realization of the demand shock. In what follows, we re-
strict the parameters of the model to satisfy the following
assumption:
Assumption 1. α− ε < q1 + q2 ≤ α+ ε.
This assumption requires that the aggregate quantity is
grater than the lowest possible demand value but does not
exceed the highest demand value. Given the stochastic
demand, the profit for firm Fi is also stochastic such that
pii = (α+∆− q1 − q2)qi, (7)
with i = 1, 2. Under asymmetric taxation, the after-tax
profit for firm F1 is described in (5). Firm F1 chooses the
optimal production level to maximize its expected profit,
E(pia1 ), where the expectation is taken over ∆. Note that
pi1 > 0 is equivalent to the condition that p > 0 or ∆ >
−α + q1 + q2. So, the expected after tax profit for firm
F1 is given by
E(pia1 ) = (α+ ε(2φ− 1)− q1− q2− t(α+ ε− q1− q2)φ)q1.
On the other hand, firm F2 attempts to maximize the
expectation of a weighted sum of its own profit and con-
sumer surplus. For a given demand quantity, q, the ex-
pected consumer surplus is:
E(CS) = E
(∫ q
0
(α+ ε− z)dz − (α+ ε− q)q
)
=
q2
2
.
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As a result, the objective function of firm F2 is E(W ) =
E(pi2) + wE(CS), or
E(W ) = (α− q1 − q2 + ε(2φ− 1))q2 + w2 (q1 + q2)
2.
4 Production decisions and market equi-
librium
We now characterize each firm’s production decision and
the resulting Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. To maximize
E(pia1 ), the optimal production level, q
∗
1 , must solve the
following equation:
∂E(pia1 )
∂q1
= α+ ε(2φ− 1)− 2q1 − q2 − t(α+ ε− 2q1 − q2)
= 0. (8)
Furthermore, we have that
∂2E(pia1 )
∂2q1
= −2 + 2t < 0.
Thus, the second-order condition for maximization is al-
ways satisfied. To maximize E(W ), the optimal produc-
tion level of firm F2, q∗2 , must satisfy the following equa-
tion:
∂E(W )
∂q2
= α+ ε(2φ−1)− q1−2q2+w(q1+ q2) = 0. (9)
The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is derived by solving
equations (8) and (9) simultaneously. So,
q∗1 =
(1− w)(α+ ε(2φ− 1))
(3− w)(1− tφ) −
− t((1− w)(α+ ε) + 2ε(1− φ))φ
(3− w)(1− tφ) (10)
and
q∗2 =
(1 + w)(α+ ε(2φ− 1))
(3− w)(1− tφ) −
− t((1 + w)(α+ ε)− 4ε(1− φ))φ
(3− w)(1− tφ) . (11)
Therefore, the aggregate quantity is given by
q∗1 + q
∗
2 =
2(α+ ε(2φ− 1)− t(α+ εφ)φ)
(3− w)(1− tφ) . (12)
5 Comparative static analysis
In this section, we evaluate the effects of the tax rate
and the preference of consumer surplus on the market
equilibrium. Applying comparative static analysis, we
have
∂q∗1
∂t
=
2εφ(2− w)(φ− 1)
(3− w)(1− tφ)2 ≤ 0.
Firm F1 produces less when the profit tax rate increases.
We conclude that the recognition of asymmetric tax
treatment leads to a smaller output level for the for-profit
firm. Turning to firm F2, we derive
∂q∗2
∂t
=
2εφ(1− w)(1− φ)
(3− w)(1− tφ)2 ≥ 0.
As the profit tax rate increases, the nonprofit firm in-
creases its output. On the other hand,
∂(q∗1 + q
∗
2)
∂t
=
2εφ(φ− 1)
(3− w)(1− tφ)2 ≤ 0.
Regardless of firm F2’s production decision, the total out-
put decreases with an increasing tax rate, leading to an
increase in the market price. Theorem 1 summarizes the
above results.
Theorem 1. As the profit tax rate increases, the for-
profit firm reduces its production whereas the nonprofit
firm increases its production. The overall effect is a re-
duction in the total production and, therefore, an increase
in market price.
Now, we are going to analyze the effect of the preference
for consumer surplus. From equality (10), we get that
∂q∗1
∂w
=
2(α+ ε(2φ− 1)− tφ(α+ εφ))
(3− w)2(tφ− 1) < 0.
Hence, when firm F2 cares more about consumer surplus,
firm F1 reduces its production level. From equality (11),
we get that
∂q∗2
∂w
=
4(α+ ε(2φ− 1)− tφ(α+ εφ))
(3− w)2(1− tφ) > 0.
Thus, firm F2 expands its production when the consumer
surplus becomes more important to its operations. From
equality (12), we get that
∂(q∗1 + q
∗
2)
∂w
=
2(α+ ε(2φ− 1)− tφ(α+ εφ))
(3− w)2(1− tφ) > 0.
That is, the increase in firm F2’s production more than
offsets the reduction in firm F1’s production. These re-
sults are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If the nonprofit firm values the consumer
surplus higher, it expands its production level. Mean-
while, the for-profit firm produces less. The overall effect
is an increase in the total production and, therefore, a
reduction in the market price.
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6 Conclusions
This paper addressed the question of asymmetric tax
schedule in a Cournot competition between a nonprofit
firm and a for-profit firm, with uncertain demand. We
computed explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, and
we analyzed the effects of the tax rate and the degree
of altruistic preference. We proved that as the tax
rate increases, the for-profit firm reduces its production,
whereas the nonprofit firm increases its production. The
overall effect is a reduction in the total production and,
therefore, an increase in market price. We also proved
that if the nonprofit firm values the consumer surplus
higher, it expands its production level, and the for-profit
firm produces less. The overall effect is an increase in
the total production and, therefore, a reduction in the
market price.
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